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OPINION OF THE COURT
             
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Charangeet Singh-Kaur,1 a native
and citizen of India, petitions this Court to
review an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that Singh
be deported from the United States to
India.  This appeal requires us to
determine whether providing food and
setting up shelter for people engaged in
terrorist activities constitutes affording
“material support” within the meaning of
the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2002), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2000 &
2002 Supp.).  For the reasons that follow,
    1At oral argument, the petitioner’s
attorney informed us that the petitioner’s
proper surname is “Singh,” and we will
refer to the petitioner by that name.
2we conclude that it does, and we will deny
the petition for review.
The BIA had jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (2002)
(renumbered 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2003)).
Because Singh was placed in deportation
proceedings before April 1, 1997, and his
final order of deportation was issued by
the BIA after October 31, 1996, we have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(1994), as amended by the transitional
rules for judicial review in section
309(c)(4) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-546, 3009-626 (Sept. 30, 1996)
(“IIRIRA”).  See also Sandoval v. Reno,
166 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
IIRIRA transitional rules of jurisdiction).
I.
Singh entered the United States
without inspection on September 27, 1989.
The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”)2 initiated deportation
proceedings.  Singh submitted an
application for asylum, asserting that if he
returned to India he would be arrested and
persecuted.  He claimed membership in the
“Babbar Khalsa Group,” whose purpose,
he said, was “to protect and promote the
Sikh faith,” and the “Sant Jarnail Sing
Bhindrawala Militant Group,” whose
purpose was “to fight for and protect the
religious and political cause of Sikh
community.”  Singh stated that he had
participated in demonstrations and other
activities of these two groups.  He further
claimed to be “on the military and police
wanted list because of known and
suspec ted  ac t iv i ti e s  again st  the
government” of India.
In an affidavit supporting his
asylum application, Singh stated that after
the Indian military attacked a Sikh holy
site called the Golden Temple in 1984, he
“together with many other young men in
our village formally took the vows to join
and follow the militant section of Sant
Jarnail, known as Babbar Khalsa.”  He
said that he participated in “planning
meetings” and “became involved in
assisting the freedom fighters in the
movement of weapons through my village
and other villages, as well as giving shelter
to militants who were involved in the
transportation of weapons.”  Subsumed in
all of this is a statement of military activity
against the government of India.
Singh submitted additional
materials supporting his application for
asylum, including evidence of active
membership in the International Sikh
Youth Federation and a statement by the
    2 The immigration enforcement
functions of the former INS were
transferred to the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services within the
Department of Homeland Security.  See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195
(2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp.
2003)).  Because the operative events in
this case took place before the name
change, INS is used here.
3Khalistan Commando Force that Singh had
taken an oath to participate with the Force.
A previous immigration judge in
this case referred Singh’s application for
asylum to the Department of State for its
non-mandatory review and comments.  See
8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1991).  In a letter dated
January 9, 1992, the State Department’s
B u r e a u  o f  Hum an Righ t s  an d
Humanitarian Affairs concluded that the
Indian government did not persecute Sikhs
such as Singh merely for their faith or
membership in certain organizations.
Rather, Sikhs targeted for arrest were those
who had involvement in specific violent
acts.
The State Department further
commented:
The applicant, however,
admits to membership in the
International Sikh Youth
Federation, a radical off-
shoot of the AISSF, as well
as the Khalistan Commando
Force, a notorious terrorist
group responsible for a
grisly April 1985 random
killing in a Punjab village,
and the equally notorious
Babbar Khalsa, an even
m o r e  f u n d a m e n t a l i s t
terrorist group with a
reputation for its use of
explosives.  Many of the
bombings resulting in the
murder of innocent persons
in recent years are attributed
to the latter group.
Following the entry of the State
Department letter, the administrative
record reflects an unexplained gap of
nearly four years in the proceedings.  On
October 23, 1995, the INS moved to re-
calendar the case for completion of
deportation proceedings.  Subsequently,
Singh informed an immigration judge that
he was the beneficiary of an approved
skilled worker visa petition enabling him
to proceed on an application for
adjustment of status.3  He stated that the
adjustment of status request would be his
principal application.
Singh then submitted an affidavit
purporting to clarify statements in his
asylum application.  He asserted that he
had never been involved in or supported
vio len t activities a gains t India n
government officials.  He stated that the
Indian police and military merely
presumed that he, as a Sikh, opposed the
government.  He said that he had
undergone an induction ceremony known
as “Amrit Chakna,” in which he
committed to remain faithful to his
religion, to wear a turban and to keep his
hair and beard long.  He stated that he was
enrolled as a member of Babbar Khalsa at
the time of this ceremony.
    3 At a hearing on September 17, 1996,
the IJ noted that “it is unfortunate to
observe that from 1990 until the present
time, 1996, nothing has been done in
regard to the respondent’s deportation
case.”  (A.R. at 80.)
4He further stated that, having
participated in Amrit Chakna, he was
expected to make charitable contributions
to the community, including “provision of
food and assistance to the poor.”  While
acknowledging that some members of
Babbar Khalsa had been involved in
violence in the 1990s, he stated that he had
been in the United States since 1989 and
did not support militant activities.  He did
state, however, that while he was in India
there were several killings of Indian police
by Muslims in Sikh clothing.
At a hearing on January 22, 1997,
Singh told the IJ that he assisted with
meetings of Sant Jarnail Singh followers:
“We – I used to help by
putting that tent and
organize the mondo [sic] or
the tent. . . . I never kept any
weapons.  Those Sikhs who
were baptized, they used to
come and they knew that I
am also baptized and I just
help them with the – giving
them food.”
On February 18, 1998, the IJ
concluded that Singh was eligible for
adjustment of status and granted his
application.  The IJ determined that even
though Singh had entered the United
States without inspection, his eight-year
presence gave him “sufficient equity to
overcome that adverse Immigration
conduct.”  The INS appealed, and on
February 26, 2003, the BIA vacated the
IJ’s order and ordered Singh removed
from the United States.  The BIA
determined that Singh was ineligible for
adjustment of status pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1255(a) and 1182(a)(3)(B)4:
We note that the respondent
testified that he was a
member of the Babbar
Khalsa and the Sant Jarnail
Singh Bhindra Wala.  See
Tr. at 64.  He further
testified that he had helped
members of these groups,
who were fighting the
Indian government, by
giving them food and
helping to set up tents for
them.  See Tr. at 65.  A
person “engages in terrorist
activities” by providing
“any type of material
support” to “any individual
the  acto r kn ow s, o r
reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity.”
See section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)
of the Act (emphasis added).
    4 The BIA quoted portions of the INA as
it read prior to enactment of the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and  Obs t ruc t  Ter ro r i sm  ( “U SA
PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 411(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 346-347
(2001).  Compare INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(2000), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(2000) with INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)
(2002), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000
& 2002 Supp.).
5We find that the described
actions, of offering food and
helping to arrange shelter
for persons, constitute
“material support,” as
contemplated by section
212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act.
The respondent further
admitted that he had offered
the described support to
“mi l i t an t s  w h o  w e r e
e n g a g e d  i n  t e r r o r i s t
activities.”  See Tr. at 65.
As these militants were
members of groups which
were designated as terrorist
organizations, by the United
States Department of State,
and on account of the
respondent’s admission that
he was aware of their
terrorist activities, we find
that the respondent did in
fact offer persons, who had
c o m m i t t e d a n d  w e r e
planning to commit terrorist
activities, material support.
(A.R. at 3) (footnote omitted).
Singh timely petitioned for review.
II.
We review the BIA’s factual
findings to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence.  Von
Pervieux v. INS, 572 F.2d 114, 118-119
(3d Cir. 1978); Carrillo-Gonzalez v. INS,
353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003).  We
will uphold the BIA’s interpretation of the
INA “unless the interpretation is ‘arbitrary,
capricious or manifestly contrary to the
statute.’”  Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d
214, 216-217 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
III.
Under the INA, the Attorney
General has authority to grant adjustments
of status to aliens who meet certain
requirements.  See INA § 245(a); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a).  The question here is whether
Singh was “admissible to the United States
for permanent residence.”  See INA §
245(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). He was
inadmissible if he “has engaged in a
t e r r o r i s t  a c t i v i t y . ”   I N A  §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2002); 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2000 & 2002 Supp.).
The INA definition of engaging in a
terrorist activity includes the provision of
“material support:”
As used in this
chapter, the term “engage in
terrorist activity” means, in
an individual capacity or as
a member of an organization
– 
. . . 
(VI) to commit an act that
the acto r kno ws , or
reasonably should know,
affords material support,
including a safe house,
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,
communications, funds,
transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit,
false documentation or
6identification, weapons
( i n c lu d i n g  c h e m i c a l ,
biological, or radiological
weapons), explosives of
training – 
(aa) for the commission of a
terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who
the  acto r kn ow s, o r
reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity;5
. . . .
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2002), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000 & 2002 Supp.)
(emphasis added).
    5 The INA defines “terrorist activity:”
As used in this chapter, the term
“terrorist activity” means any activity
which is unlawful under the laws of the
place where it is committed (or which, if
committed in the United States, would be
unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves
any of the following:
(I) The hijacking or
sabotage of any conveyance
(including an aircraft,
vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining,
and threatening to kill,
injure, or continue to detain,
another individual in order
to compel a third person
(including a governmental
organization) to do or
abstain from doing any act
as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of
the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon
an internationally protected
person (as defined in section
1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or
upon the liberty of such a
person.
(IV) An assassination
(V) The use of any – 
(a) biological agent,
chemical agent, or nuclear
weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm or
other weapon or dangerous
device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain),
with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the
safety of one or more
individuals or to cause
substantial damage to
property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or
conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2002); 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & 2002 Supp.).
7The BIA stated that the Department
of State had designated Babbar Khalsa as
a terrorist organization.  None of the
organizations to which Singh belonged,
including Babbar Khalsa, are among the
thirty-six Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(“FTO”) designated by the United States
Department of State in accordance with
INA § 219, 8 U.S.C. § 1189.  See 31
C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A.  Babbar Khalsa and
the International Sikh Youth Federation,
however, were named by the Department
of the Treasury on June 27, 2002, as
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(“SDGT”) organizations in accordance
with an asset-freezing program authorized
in 2001 by Presidential Executive Order
13224.  See 31 C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A; see
also Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The ‘FTO
List’ and Congress: Sa nction ing
D e s i g n a t e d  F o r e i g n  T e r r o r i s t
Organizations,” CRS Report for Congress
(Oct. 21, 2003).
We need not, however, determine
whether the BIA erred in retroactively
applying the SDGT designations to the
organizations with which Singh interacted
in India prior to 1989.  Nor do we need to
consider whether Babbar Khalsa, Sant
Jarnail Singh, the International Sikh Youth
Federation or any other group was a
terrorist organization within the meaning
of INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) or (dd),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) or
(dd).  Rather, our task tracks the narrow
compass of determining whether Singh’s
conduct in providing food and setting up
tents constituted “material support” either
“for the commission of terrorist activity”
or “to any individual who the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, has committed
or plans to commit a terrorist activity.”
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa) and (bb);
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa) and
(bb).  This is so because inadmissibility
results from provision of material support
either to those who have committed or
plan to commit terrorist activity or to
terrorist organizations.  See INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U .S.C . §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).  The BIA based its
decision on the former.
We must first determine whether
the type of activity in which Singh
engaged comes within the statutory
definition of “material support” as a matter
of law.  If we conclude that it does, we
must then decide whether Singh’s conduct
constituted “material support” as a matter
of fact.
IV.
We turn now to the statute.  We
start with “the language employed by
Congress, . . . and we assume that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used.”  INS
v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The word “material” means “[h]aving
some logical connection with the
consequential facts.”  Black’s Law
Dictionary 991 (7th ed. 1999).  It also
means “significant” or “essential.”  Id.
Support is defined as: “[s]ustenance or
maintenance; esp., articles such as food
and clothing that allow one to live in the
8degree of comfort to which one is
accustomed.”  Id. at 1453.
In illustrating the concept of
“material support” to those engaged in
ter ror is t  a ct iv it ie s,  IN A  section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) provides various
examples that broadly cover the areas of
lodging, communications, transportation,
financing, weapons and provision of other
means to accomplish terrorist activities.
The list presented in INA section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), supra, is not
exhaustive.  No language in the statute
limits “material support” to the
enumerated examples.  Use of the term
“including” suggests that Congress
intended to illustrate a broad concept
rather than narrowly circumscribe a term
with exclusive categories.  See In re SGL
Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating that a statute in which the
word “including” was followed by a list of
factors “strongly suggests those factors are
not exhaustive”).
Tha t  t he  f edera l  s ta tu te
criminalizing the provision of “material
support or resources” to terrorists, 18
U.S.C. section 2339A,6 includes a longer
list of examples does not lead to the
c o n c l u s io n  t h a t  I N A  s e c t i o n
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) must be read as an
exhaustive list.  We are familiar with the
canon of statutory construction urged on us
by Singh: “where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
432 (1987) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).  
This canon, however, is not
applicable in this case.  First, the two
statutes were not enacted by the same
Congress.  The INA provision was adopted
in 1990 and revised in 2001, and the
criminal provision was adopted in 1994.
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-
5070 (1990); Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT”) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §411(a)(1), 115
Stat. 272, 345-347 (2001); Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005(a),
108 Stat. 1796, 2022 (1994).  Thus, we
cannot say that the differences in the two
statutes are “significantly highlighted by
the fact that the same Congress
simultaneously drafted” them.  Cardozo-
    6 “In this section, the term ‘material
support or resources’ means currency or
monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and
other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials.”  18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b).
9Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432.  Second, it
would be incongruous to conclude that a
person who provides food and sets up tents
for terrorists could be jailed for up to life
under 18 U.S.C. section 2339A, but the
same conduct could not prohibit admission
to the United States under INA section
212.  See United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d
429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating avoidance
of “unintended or absurd results” is a
“deeply rooted rule of statutory
construction”) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
For the reasons described above,
the BIA’s conclusion that Congress
intended INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)
to include provision of food and setting up
tents within the definition of “material
support” was not “arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Ahmed, 341 F.3d at 216-217; see also
McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 599 (9th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting as “too narrow” the
petitioner’s argument that the nonpolitical
crimes exception to withholding of
deportation in the former INA section
243(h), 8 U.S.C. section 1253(h), applied
“only to those who actually ‘pulled the
trigger’” and holding instead that it
encompassed those who provide “the
physical and logistical support that enable,
modern terrorist groups to operate”).
V.
We must now apply the foregoing
precepts to the facts in this case.
A.
In response to questioning from the
IJ at a hearing on January 22, 1997, Singh
described his role in meetings of Sant
Jarnail Singh followers:
Q.W ell, but in this
statement, sir, that I just
read to you, you say there
were known activities that
you took against the Indian
government.  What were
those activities?
A.Sant Jarna il Singh
organized meetings in
d i f f e r e n t v i l l a g e s  to
propagate religion.
Q.So, in other words you’re
telling me that you attended
these meetings, correct?
A.Yes.  We used to have
those people to arrange our
tents and put some – some
sort of – arrange preparation
of the food and also arrange
to bring people to these
gatherings and then take
them back to their places.
(A.R. at 115-116.)
Later in the same hearing, Singh
responded to questions from the INS
attorney:
Q.So, in other words, you
were helping the militants
who were involved in
terrorist activities?  Isn’t
that true?
10
A.When we came from far
away to this (indiscernible)
congregation, then we may
have some contact.  We
never help in any other way
than giving them food.  Yes.
(A.R. at 124.)
Taking Singh’s statement of
minimal participation, it is beyond cavil
that Singh furnished food and shelter to
Sant Jarnail Singh followers participating
in meetings.  The sole remaining issue is
whether the individuals to whom Singh
provided food and shelter come within the
rubric of INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv).
B.
We must now decide whether
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Singh provided food
and shelter to individuals who he knew or
reasonably should have known had
committed or planned to commit terrorist
activity.
We begin with the statutory
definition of “terrorist activity” as “any
activity which is unlawful under the laws
of the place where it is committed” and
involving, among other things, “[t]he use
of any . . . explosive, firearm or other
weapon or dangerous device (other than
for mere personal monetary gain), with
intent to endanger, directly or indirectly,
the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property.”
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).  The evidence is clear
that at the time of Singh’s participation
with them, the members of the various
militant Sikh organizations opposed to the
Indian government had committed or
planned to commit terrorist activity.
Although Singh stated that the
purpose of the meetings at which he
provided food and shelter was to propagate
the teachings of Sant Jarnail Singh, he did
not elaborate at the January 22, 1997
hearing on the content of those teachings.
In his first affidavit, however, Singh
stated: “Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala
was never inclined to be militant.
However, after his death his group became
militant because of the violence
perpetrated upon him and his and his [sic]
followers by the Indian Military.”
A 1985 Amnesty International
Report submitted by Singh as part of his
asylum application related a June 5, 1984
battle, where “heavy fighting ensued
between the army and the followers of
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh
fundamentalist leader who had taken
refuge in the temple and who the
government blamed for directing much of
the violence in the Punjab in recent years.”
Although Babbar Khalsa and the
International Sikh Youth Federation,
groups to which Singh belonged, were not
named Specially Designated Global
Terrorist organizations until 2002, it does
not follow that members of those groups
were not involved in terrorist activities
prior to 1989.  In commenting on Singh’s
asylum application in 1992, the State
Depar tment conclu ded th at :  the
International Sikh Youth Federation was a
11
“radical off-shoot” of another group; that
the Khalistan Commando Force, to which
Singh had taken an oath, was “a notorious
terrorist group responsible for a grisly
April 1985 random killing in a Punjab
village”; and that Babbar Khalsa was
“equally notorious,” was “an even more
fundamentalist terrorist group with a
reputation for its use of explosives” and
was responsible for bombings that killed
innocent people.
The activities described by the State
Department come within the meaning of
the INA’s definition of terrorist activities
because they involved assassinations and
use of explosives “with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the safety of one or
m o r e  i n d i v i d u a l s . ”   I N A  §
212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV) and (V) (2002); 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV) and (V)
(2000 & 2002 Supp.).  The Amnesty
International Report and Singh’s own
statements provide evidence that the
followers of Sant Jarnail Singh also
engaged in terrorist activities within the
meaning of the INA.
Even in light of the recantations
made in his second affidavit, Singh’s self-
described activities in conjunction with his
membership in various militant Sikh
organizations consisted of: (1) providing
food to militant Sikhs who had committed
or planned to commit terrorist activity; and
(2) setting up tents for meetings of
militants who had committed or planned to
commit terrorist activity.7
Although Singh himself denied
participating directly in any violence,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that he knew or should have
known the militant Sikhs to whom he
provided food and shelter had committed
or planned to commit terrorist activities
within the meaning of the statute.  That is
sufficient to render Singh inadmissible
under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb).
Because he was inadmissible, Singh did
not meet the requirements for adjustment
of status.  INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a).
The petition for review will be
denied.
    7 Although other matters were presented
by a f f i d a v it  a n d  tes tim on y a t
administrative hearings, our review is
confined to the bases upon which the BIA
relied for its order.  See Securities and
Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[W]e emphasized
a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law.  That rule is to the
effect that a reviewing court, in dealing
with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized
to make, must judge the propriety of such
action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency.”).  Here, the grounds are
“offering food and helping to arrange
shelter.”
12
FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Finding that Singh-Kaur helped
members of Sikh militant groups “by
giving them food and helping to set up
tents,” the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) held that Singh-Kaur “engaged in
terrorist activities.”  However, Singh-Kaur
testified that the meetings were for
religious purposes, and the BIA did not
find Singh-Kaur’s testimony to lack
credibility.  The issue here is therefore
straightforward – whether providing food
and tents for such meetings, without more,
constitutes “engag[ing] in terrorist
activity” through provision of “material
support.”  The acts here are not of the
degree and kind contemplated by the
“material support” provision – material
acts in support of terrorism.  Because the
majority’s holding ignores the plain
language of the statute by reading
“material” out of “material support,” I
respectfully dissent.
I.
Before addressing the statute, it is
necessary to clarify the scope and standard
of our review.  The majority does not at
first restrict its discussion to the BIA’s
findings, and recites in detail material from
Singh-Kaur’s 1991 asylum application.
See Maj. Op. at 2-5.  Although those facts
cast Singh-Kaur in an unfavorable light,
the majority ultimately concedes in a
footnote that Singh-Kaur’s asylum
application was not relevant to the BIA’s
decision, which rested solely on food and
tents.  See Maj. Op. at 11 n.7.8  Indeed, the
BIA, in reversing the order of the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”), did not recite or
rely upon the 1991 asylum application at
all.  And although we do not review the
findings of the IJ, he accepted Singh-
Kaur’s testimony disclaiming the asylum
application in finding Singh-Kaur eligible
for adjustment of status.  Thus, our scope
of review is limited to the BIA’s stated
basis of “offering food and helping to
arrange shelter” for these meetings.  See
also Ernesto Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646,
658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000) (we “cannot
affirm the BIA on a ground upon which it
did not rely”).9
It must be further noted that Singh-
Kaur testified that the food and tents were
set up for religious meetings.  Neither the
    8As acknowledged in the footnote, the
majority concedes that “[a]lthough other
matters were presented by affidavit and
testimony at the administrative hearings,
our review is confined to the bases upon
which the BIA relied for its order.”  Maj.
Op. at 11 n.7 (citing SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
    9“The final order we normally review is
the decision of the BIA, unless the BIA
defers to the IJ’s findings.”  Miah v.
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542,
549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Here, the BIA did
not defer, expressly or by necessary
implication, to the IJ’s findings.
Accordingly, we review the order of the
BIA.
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IJ nor the BIA made an adverse credibility
finding.  Because the BIA did not adopt or
defer to the IJ’s finding on credibility, we
“must proceed as if [petitioner’s]
testimony were credible and determine
whether the BIA's decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the face of his
assumed (but not determined) credibility.”
Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235
(3d Cir. 2003); see also Lim v. INS, 224
F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2000) (where
neither IJ nor BIA make express credibility
findings, court must accept testimony as
true).  Therefore, we must assume Singh-
Kaur’s testimony before the IJ to be true.
In addition, it must be noted – as
the majority implicitly concedes – that the
BIA erred in finding that the Babbar
Khalsa and Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindra
Wala (hereinafter, “Sant Jarnail”) groups
had been designated terrorist organizations
by the Department of State.10  See Maj.
Op. at 7.  Thus, as the majority appears to
agree, the BIA’s holding cannot be upheld
on the basis that Singh-Kaur provided
“material support” to a terroris t
organization.  Rather, the BIA’s holding
rests solely on the narrow ground that the
provision of food and tents prior to 1989 to
unnamed members of the Babbar Khalsa
and Sant Jarnail organizations was the
provision of “material support . . . to any
individual the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity.”  However, the
record does not contain any evidence as to
what terrorist acts, if any, these unnamed
individuals committed or planned to
commit. 
Regarding our standard of review,
the BIA’s interpretation of the statute
cannot be upheld under any standard.  The
majority appears to apply Chevron
deference, see Maj. Op. at 5, but as the
statute is unambiguous and its meaning is
plain, unbridled agency deference is
unwarranted.  As the Supreme Court held
in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), we
only defer “to agency interpretations of
statutes that, applying the normal ‘tools of
statutory construction,’ are ambiguous.”
Id. at 320 n.45 (quoting Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984)); see also Steele v. Blackman, 236
F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the
language of a statute is clear, however, the
    10As noted by the majority, see Maj. Op.
at 7, neither organization has been
des i g n a te d  a  F o r e i g n  Terror is t
Organization by the Department of State in
accordance with INA § 219, 8 U.S.C. §
1189.  See 31 C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A.  The
majority correctly notes that Babbar
Khalsa was designated as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist organization
in accordance with an asset-freezing
program authorized by Presidential
Executive Order 13224 in 2001.  See 31
C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A.  However, the
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
designation was done by the Department
of Treasury and not the Department of
State, and is not the same as Foreign
Terrorist Organization designation.
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text of the statute is the end of the
matter.”).11
II.
Examining the statute’s plain
language and employing the “normal tools
of statutory construction,” I conclude that
Congress did not intend “material support”
to embrace acts that are not of importance
or relevance to terrorism.  To hold
otherwise reads “material” out of “material
support” and treats half of the statutory
term as surplusage.  Such a result is
inconsistent with the plain language of the
statute and with the normal tools of
statutory construction.
Section 245 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that an
alien may be eligible for adjustment of
status, if, among other things, he is
“admissible to the United States for
permanent residence.”  INA § 245(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1255(a).  Section 212, in turn,
provides that any alien who “has engaged
in a terrorist activity” is inadmissible.  INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)( i)(I), 8  U.S .C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).  Thus, we must
determine whether the BIA properly found
that Singh-Kaur had “engaged in a terrorist
activity.”  Under INA § 212, “engage in
terrorist activity” means, among other
things:
(VI) to commit an act that the
actor knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support,
i n c l u d in g  a  s a f e  h o u s e ,
transportation, communications,
funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification,
weapons (including chemical,
b i o l o g ical ,  or  rad iolo g i c al
weapons), explosives, or training–
(aa) for the commission of a
terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the
actor knows, or reasonably should
    11In any case, the conclusion does not
hinge upon the standard of review.  As the
majority states in reciting the standard for
Chevron deference, “[w]e will uphold the
BIA’s interpretation of the INA unless the
interpretation is arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Maj.
Op. at 5 (quoting Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341
F.3d 214, 216-217 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted)) (quotations omitted and
emphasis added).  Here, the BIA’s
construction is manifestly contrary to the
statute’s plain meaning because it reads
“material” out of “material support,” so
under any standard of review, the
majority’s conclusion cannot stand.
Indeed, even where Chevron deference is
applicable, we nevertheless consider the
“thoroughness evident in [the agency’s]
consideration” and “the validity of its
reasoning.”  Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d
559, 569 (3d Cir. 2003), pet. for cert. filed,
(U.S. Jan 27, 2004) (No. 03-8662).  Here,
the BIA supplies no reasoning beyond the
bare assertion that food and tents
constitute “material support.”  Thus, under
any standard, the conclusion remains the
same.
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know, has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization
described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization
described in clause (vi)(III), unless
the actor can demonstrate that he
did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the act
would further the organization’s
terrorist activity.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
I agree with the majority’s
threshold canon that “‘we assume that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used.’”
Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting INS v. Phinpathya,
464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
Employing that canon, I have no doubt that
the term “support,” in isolation, could
embrace food and tents.  As noted by the
majority, support is defined as:
“Sustenance or maintenance; esp., articles
such as food and clothing that allow one to
live in the degree of comfort to which one
is accustomed.”  Id. (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1453 (7th ed. 1999)).  Had the
statute referred to mere “support,” I might
concur with my colleagues, as substantial
evidence shows that “support” was
afforded.
But the analysis does not end there
because “material” qualifies “support.”
The majority correctly notes two meanings
for “material” in this context – “[h]aving
some logical connection with the
consequential facts,” and “significant” or
“essential.”  Id. (quoting Black’s, supra, at
991).  Similarly, Webster’s defines
“material” in part as “being of real
importance or great consequence.”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dict. 1392
(1981).
Even a cursory examination of the
“material support” provision makes it clear
that both meanings of “material” –
relevance and importance – are embraced
by the statute.  Regarding relevance, the
statute’s express language requires an act
that “affords material support” that is
either “for the commission of a terrorist
activity,” “to any individual who the actor
knows, or reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist
activity,” or “to a terrorist organization.”
Thus, the support must be relevant to the
specified terrorist goal, terrorist persons, or
terrorist organizations, which in sum
means that the support must be relevant to
terrorism.  Regarding importance, the
statute recites a laundry list of types of
“material support” that are relevant to
terrorism – safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds
or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons
(including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or
training.  All are plainly important to
terroris m, terrorists,  o r terroris t
organizations.  Thus, the support must be
important to terrorism.
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Therefore, even under the broadest
possible reading, “material” in this context
must mean both “important” and
“relevant” to terrorism.  “Material
support,” by its plain language, means that
the act affording support must be of a kind
and degree that has relevance and
importance to terrorist activity, terrorists,
or terrorist organizations.  Put another
way, an act “affording material support”
must move the ball down the field for
terrorism.  This is not to say that under
certain circumstances, food and shelter
could not be “material support.”  But as
these are normal types of “support,” the
facts must show that they are more than
mere support – i.e., they must be of
relevance and importance to terrorism.
The conclusion that “material”
means both importance and relevance is
underscored by further examination of the
statute.  First, mere “support” cannot be
“material support.”  As noted, “support”
means “sustenance or maintenance.”
There is no doubt that sustenance, such as
food and water, or maintenance, such as
shelter, are necessary for life, but they are
not per se necessary for terrorism.  To hold
differently would – in cases like this one,
involving food and tents – automatically
transmute mere “support” into “material
support.”  This would eviscerate the
statute.  Had Congress intended the mere
provision of food and shelter, without
more, to be “engag[ing] in terrorist
activity,” there would have been no need
to include the term “material” in the
statute.  An indisputable axiom of statutory
construction is that “whenever possible
each word in a statutory provision is to be
given meaning and not to be treated as
surplusage.”  Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Sloan,
263 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Ki Se
Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 223 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“we should adopt a
construction which recognizes each
element of the statute”).12  Here,
“material” has an obvious meaning and is
not surplusage.
Second, the examples of “material
support” provided in the statute all regard
acts of importance and relevance to
terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist
organizations – safe houses, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds
or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons
(including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or
training.  This reinforces the conclusion
    12Food and shelter indeed could be,
under certain circumstances, important and
relevant to terrorism.  It is not impossible
to imagine a hypothetical situation where
a dying terrorist begs an alien for a glass of
water so that he can survive long enough
to walk the last half-mile to complete his
terrorist aim.  Under those circumstances,
the support would be more than mere
support, as it had relevance and
importance to terrorism under those
circumstances.  But as discussed in Part
III, infra, that situation is not before us.
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that “material support” means exactly that,
support that is material.13
That fact that the listing of types of
“material support” is not exhaustive does
not transform any type of support into
material support.  I do not disagree with
the majority that the use of “including”
before the laundry list means that the
enumerated listing is not exhaustive.  See
In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154,
160 (3d Cir. 1999) (use of “including”
followed by a listing of factors “strongly
suggests those factors are not exhaustive”).
However, it does not follow that any kind
of support is material support.  Indeed, the
majority ignores the canon that “[a]nother
‘commonplace [rule] of statutory
construction’ is that the ‘specific governs
the general.’”  Ki See Lee, 368 F.3d at 223
(quoting Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 154–55 (3d Cir.
1999)) (alteration in original).  Here, the
enumerated examples, consistent with the
plain language of the term “material
support,” are all acts that can be of
importance and relevance to terrorism.
Any unenumerated act that is alleged to
constitute “material support” must
therefore be measured by the plain
language of the term “material support”
and the nature of the enumerated
examples.  Even the enumerated act that is
arguably the closest to the facts at hand
here – provision of a “safe house”14 – is
plainly of a degree and kind that is
important and relevant to terrorism and far
different from the mere provision of food
and tents.15
    13In its decision, the BIA recited the
prior version of INA § 212.  This provision
was amended and expanded in 2001
pursuant to the PATRIOT Act.  See
Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 411(a)(1)(F), 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (“PATRIOT Act”).  Petitioner
concedes the current version applies, so
the analysis above focuses on the law as it
exists now.  Under either version, the
BIA’s conclusion does not comport with
the plain language.  It should be noted that
in the PATRIOT Act, Congress added
“chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons” to the laundry list of activities
constituting “material support.”  The
gravity of such activities reinforces the
conclusion that “material support” is not
“immaterial support.”
    14Strangely, the majority states that the
express language of the statute embraces
“lodging.”  Maj. Op. at 8.  However, the
statute does not include the term
“lodging,” but only “safe house.”  By
asserting that “lodging” is “material
support” without explanation, the majority
begs the question before us – whether tents
and food are “material support” in the first
place.  Safe houses by definition aid and
abet in terrorism, whereas lodging might
not.
    15Thus, I disagree with my colleagues
that the mere fact that the listing is not
exhaustive means that “the BIA’s
conclusion that Congress intended INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) to include provision
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Third, my conclusion is further
confirmed by the statute’s surrounding
provisions.  In determining Congress’
intent, “we look to the statute’s language,
structure, subject matter, context, and
history–factors that typically help courts
determine a statute’s objectives and
thereby illuminate its text.”  Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228
(1998); Beecham v. United States, 511
U.S. 368, 372 (1994) (“The plain meaning
that we seek to discern is the plain
meaning of the whole statute, not of
isolated sentences.”).  Here, “afford[ing]
material support” is but one of six
examples of “engaging in terrorist
activity.”  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). These other
examples of “engaging in terrorist
activity” are all grievous forms of conduct
whose relevance and importance to
terrorism are indisputable:  (1) committing
or inciting terrorist activity; (2) preparing
or planning terrorist activity; (3) gathering
information on potential targets for
terrorist activity; (4) soliciting funds or
other things of value for a terrorist activity
or organization; and (5) soliciting any
individual to engage in terrorist activity or
to join a terrorist organization.  INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(V), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(V).
As the majority rightly suggests in
a different context, avoiding “unintended
or absurd results” is a “deeply rooted rule
of statutory construction.”  United States v.
Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003).
It would be absurd for five of the
definitions of “engage in terrorist activity”
to be of import and gravity, but for the
sixth definition to be otherwise.  “Statutory
construction is a holistic endeavor ... and,
at a minimum, must account for a statute’s
full text, language as well as punctuation,
structure, and subject matter.”  Tineo v.
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2003)
(parenthetically quoting United States
Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993))
(alteration in original).  As each
disjunctive example of “engage in terrorist
activity” is a significant form of conduct
that materially furthers the goals of
terrorism, so does “material support.”16
See Beecham, 511 U.S. at 371 (“Thatof food and setting up tents within the
definition of ‘material support’ was not
‘arbitrary, capricious or manifestly
contrary to the statute.’”  Maj. Op. at 9.
For one thing, Chevron deference is not
warranted as the plain language compels
the opposite conclusion from that reached
by the BIA.  For another, even under
Chevron, the BIA’s reading is “manifestly
contrary” to the statute to the extent the
BIA concluded that food and tents, without
more, constitute “material support.”
    16Further examination of the
surrounding portions of INA § 212 only
reinforces this conclusion.  The definitions
of “terrorist activity” and the ultimate ban
on admissibility for those engaging in such
activity both recite conduct of extreme
gravity.  See INA § 212(a)(3)(B),
2 1 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( B ) ( i i i ) ,  8  U . S . C .  §
1182(a)(3)(B), 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
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several items in a list share an attribute
counsels in favor of interpreting the other
items as possessing that attribute as
well.”).
As a final matter, I turn briefly to
the criminal material support statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2339A.  Both Singh-Kaur and the
majority argue that the statute supports
their respective positions.  The statute,
entitled “Providing material support to
terrorists,” prohibits the provision of
“material support or resources” for
preparing or carrying out any of a list of
enumerated terrorist and other significant
c r i m e s . 1 7   U n l i k e  I N A  §
212, the definition of “material support or
resources” in § 2339A includes both safe
houses and lodging.
I disagree with Singh-Kaur, who
argues that under the maxim of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the presence of
“lodging” in § 2339A, and its absence in
INA § 212, means that Congress did not
intend “lodging” to be “material support”
for purposes of § 212.  As noted above, the
listing in INA § 212 is not exhaustive.
Thus, the real question, as discussed
    1718 U.S.C. § 2339A provides:
(a ) Offense.–Whoever
provides material support or
resources or conceals or disguises
the nature, location, source, or
ownership of material support or
resources, knowing or intending
that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out,
a violation of section 32, 37, 81,
175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n),
844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1114,
1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363,
1366, 1751, 1992, 1993, 2155,
2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a,
2332b, 2332f, or 2340A of this
title, section 236 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2284), or section 46502 or
60123(b) of title 49, or in
preparation for, or in carrying out,
the concealment of an escape from
the commission of any such
violation, or attempts or conspires
to do such an act, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both, and, if
the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of
years or for life. A violation of this
section may be prosecuted in any
Federal judicial district in which
the underlying offense was
committed, or in any other Federal
judicial district as provided by law.
(b) Definition.–In this
section, the term “material support
or resources” means currency or
monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification,
commun ica t io ns  equ ipmen t,
f a c i l i t ie s ,  w e a p o n s ,  l e th a l
substances, explosives, personnel,
transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious
materials.
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above, is not whether non-enumerated
conduct can be “material support,” but
whether non-enumerated supportive acts
rise to the requisite level of materiality.
I also part with the majority, which
concludes that the existence of § 2339A
requires that we construe INA § 212 so
broadly that we read “material” out of the
statute.  The majority suggests that “it
would be incongruous to conclude that a
person who provides food and sets up tents
for terrorists could be jailed for up to life
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, but the same
conduct could not prohibit admission to
the United States under INA § 212.”  Maj.
Op. at 9.
The majority’s suggestion of
incongruity is easily dismissed.  Section
2339A requires that the “material support
or resources” be provided by a person,
“knowing or intending that they are to be
used in preparation for, or in carrying out”
a long list of specific and extremely
serious crimes of terror.18  Under that
statute, the mere provision of food and
tents, even to a terrorist, would not be a
criminal act unless the “material support or
resources” were knowingly or intentionally
supplied “to be used in preparation for, or
in carrying out” one of § 2339A’s
specified and grievous terrorist crimes. 
Thus, one could not be jailed under
§ 2339A, let alone jailed for life,19 for
providing a terrorist with a glass of water,
unless, for example, the water was heavy
water that the defendant knows or intends
be used to develop a nuclear weapon.  The
majority does not explain how the mere
provision of food and tents, without more,
might constitute knowing or intentional
provision of “material support or
resources” that are “to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out” terrorist
acts such as hijacking or unleashing
weapons of mass destruction.  In sum,
there is no incongruity,20 and § 2339A
    18The statute lists over thirty specific,
serious acts of criminal terror that include
destruction of aircraft, 18 U.S.C. § 32;
violence at international airports, 18
U.S.C. § 37; prohibitions with respect to
biological weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 175; use
of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 229;
assassination and kidnapping of members
of Congress, the Cabinet, and the Supreme
Court, 18 U.S.C. § 351; transactions
involving nuclear materials, 18 U.S.C. §
831; and many more crimes, nearly all
obviously terroristic and hugely significant
in nature.
    19I note that the majority’s hypothetical
sentence of life imprisonment under §
2339A could not even arise unless the
tents and food were somehow used in
preparation for or in carrying out a serious
act of terrorism that led to death.  Nowhere
does the majority explain how Singh-
Kaur’s food and tents was connected,
directly or indirectly, to any death.
    20Indeed, I believe that under
appropriate circumstances – not at hand
here – a glass of water could constitute
“material support” under INA § 212 as
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does not support the majority’s attempt
treat INA § 212’s recitation of  “material”
as surplusage.
“Material support,” by its plain
language, means that the act affording
support must be of a kind and degree that
has relevance and importance for terrorist
a c t iv i ty,  te r ror is t s ,  o r  t e r ro r i s t
organizations, and cannot be mere support.
In the next section, I apply this plain
reading to the facts of the case and
conclude that Singh-Kaur’s mere support
does not rise to the requisite level of
materiality.
III.
Applying the facts to the law,
substantial evidence does not support the
BIA’s finding that Singh-Kaur provided
“material support.”  Nothing in the record
shows how the food and tents were
important and relevant to terrorism, and
indeed, Singh-Kaur testified that they were
provided for religious meetings.  The
majority therefore relies on speculation by
concluding that mere support to unnamed
persons who may or may not have engaged
in unknown terrorist activities constitutes
“material support.”  This conclusion
substitutes conjecture for proof and reads
“material” out of “material support.”
Here, the majority concludes that
“[t]he evidence is clear that at the time of
Singh’s participation with them, the
members of the various militant Sikh
organizations opposed to the Indian
government had committed or planned to
commit terrorist activity.”  Maj. Op. at 10.
The majority bases its holding on five
premises:  (1) Singh-Kaur supplied food
and tents (2) prior to 1989 (3) to unnamed
members of the Babbar Khalsa and/or Sant
Jarnail organizations (4) who engaged in
unnamed terrorist acts or planned to
engage in such unnamed acts, and (5)
Singh-Kaur knew or should have known
that these unnamed individuals engaged in
unnamed terrorist acts or planned to
engage in such unnamed acts.
At best, only the first three premises
are supported by the record.  There is no
dispute that Singh-Kaur supplied food and
tents prior to 1989 to unnamed members of
at least one of these organizations.  But the
administrative record contains nothing
about whether the individuals at issue had
engaged in terrorist acts or planned to do
so.  Indeed, the record is to the contrary –
Singh-Kaur testified that the meetings
were for religious purposes.  The IJ did not
find Singh-Kaur’s testimony to lack
credibility and the BIA did not find
otherwise; we therefore “must proceed as
if [petitioner’s] testimony were credible
and determine whether the BIA's decision
is supported by substantial evidence in the
face of his assumed (but not determined)
credibility.”  Kayembe, 334 F.3d at 235;
well, so long as the water was relevant and
important to terrorism.  See note 5, supra
(noting that under INA § 212, a glass of
water may constitute “material support”
where it was provided to a terrorist so that
he can survive long enough to walk the
last half-mile to complete his terrorist aim
because such support would be both
important and relevant to terrorism).
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see also Lim, 224 F.3d at 933 (where
neither the IJ nor the BIA expressly made
credibility findings, Court must accept
testimony as true).  Nor did the BIA base
its finding on other evidence of record,
such as the disclaimed 1991 asylum
affidavit.
Accordingly, we are limited to the
BIA’s finding that Singh-Kaur supplied
food and tents, and we must assume that
his testimony before the IJ was true.  In
this regard, it is helpful to review the
testimony:
IJ: Sir, I want to read to you
something that you wrote in an
asylum application that you gave to
the Immigration Service.  You say
“I am on the military and police
wanted list because of known and
suspected activities against the
government and when I left I had
failed to meet their reporting
requirements.”  Now, my first
question to you, sir, is this.  Were
you on a military and police wanted
list in India, sir?
A: Yes, on police.
Q: Why?
A: Because I baptized.  After [the]
killing of Jarnail Singh [by Indian
authorities], they made a list of all
those people who got baptized and
then they started catching all those
people.
Q: So, it was only because you
were baptized as a Sikh, sir.  Is that
what you mean?
A: Yes, because I was baptized.
That’s why.
Q: Well, but in this statement, sir,
that I just read to you, you say there
were known activities that you took
against the Indian government.
What were those activities?
A: Sant Jarnail Singh organized
meetings in different villages to
propagate religion.
Q: So, in other words you’re telling
me that you attended these
meetings, correct?
A: Yes.  We used to have those
people to arrange our tents and put
some – some sort of – arrange
preparation of the food and also
arrange to bring people to these
gatherings and then take them back
to their places.
Q: Did you do anything else?
A: No.
Q: Sir, when you say here there
were known activities against the
Indian government, that is what
you’re referring to, sir?
A: W e were  no t  aga ins t
gov ernm ent,  but  w e  were
propagating the teachings of our
Sant.
. . . . 
Q: . . . Were you ever involved in
any violent activities against the
Indian government – wait until I
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finish, please, sir – in support of an
independent Sikh state?
A: Yes.  We want Khalistan, but
we don’t want by the means of
violence.
Q: Well, I want you to answer the
question I asked you, sir.  You have
not answered it.  Were you ever
involved in any violent activity in
India?
A: No.
A review of this testimony makes it
clear that Singh-Kaur disclaimed any
connection to violence.  It also shows that
the meetings at question were “to
propagate religion.”  It further shows that
the tents and food were supplied to
members of Sant Jarnail.  Nothing in the
testimony reflects that the purpose or
subject of the meetings was to facilitate
terrorism.
Shortly thereafter, the government’s
lawyer questioned Singh-Kaur:
Q: Sir, according to your
application for asylum, you joined
the Babbar Khalsa group in 1993.
Is that so?
A: In 1983.
Q: I’m sorry, 1983.
A: I got baptized and then my
name was written that he belongs to
Babbar Khalsa.
Q: And, according to your
application for asylum you joined
the Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindra
Wala militant group in 1984.  Isn’t
that correct?
A: I was baptized by Sant Jarnail
Singh Bhindra Wala.
Q: And, you joined his group,
militant group, in 1984.  Isn’t that
correct?
A: This is not a militant group.
Q: According to your application
for asylum, it’s called the Sant
Jarnail Singh Bhindra Wala militant
group.
A: That may be a mistake by my
lawyer, but he was saying that by
getting baptized you will have your
own army, you will have your own
garment, you will have your own
police.
Q: And, sir, the purpose of this
g roup , acco rd ing  to  yo ur
application, is to fight for and
protect the religious and political
cause of the Sikh community.  Is
that true?
A: This group propagates the
religion and whatever the teachings
of our ten gurus, that group also
propagates those teachings.
Q: And, according to your
affidavit, which is attached to your
application for asylum, you assisted
the freedom fighters in your village
in the movement of weapons
through your village.  Isn’t that
correct?
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A: No.  We – I used to help by
putting that tent and organize the
mondo (phonetic sp.) or the tent.
Q: And, it also states that you gave
shelter to these militants who were
involved in the transport –
transportation of weapons.  Isn’t
that true?
A: No, I never kept any weapons.
Those Sikhs who were baptized,
they used to come and they knew
that I am also baptized and I just
help them with the – giving them
food.
Again, Singh-Kaur disclaimed
engaging in militant activities or moving
weapons, and he reaffirmed the religious
nature of the matter.  It is in this context
that we must analyze whether the support
he provided was “material,” i.e., more than
mere support, and support of importance
and relevance to terrorism.
As a threshold matter and as
acknowledged by the majority, the BIA
erred in determining that Babbar Khalsa
and Sant Jarnail were designated by the
State Department as terrorist organizations
pursuant to INA § 219.  See Maj. Op. at 7;
see also note 3, supra.  In addition, the
testimony above makes it clear that the
food and tents were supplied to members
of Sant Jarnail.  The Sant Jarnail
organization has not been designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization or as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
organization, either by the Department of
State or the Department of Treasury.
Accordingly, the BIA’s holding that the
State Department has designated Sant
Jarnail as a terrorist organization is
incorrect and is by itself reversible error.21
Recognizing this error, the majority
does not hold that Singh-Kaur supplied
“material support” to a  terroris t
organization, but instead, to an “individual
who the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, has committed or plans to commit a
terrorist activity.”  But the record is devoid
of any evidence of who these individuals
were, what terrorist activities they had
done, or what terrorist acts they planned to
commit.  There is also no evidence of what
Singh-Kaur knew or should have known
regarding these unknown activities.  The
only evidence that the BIA and majority
appear to latch upon in this regard is the
following exchange at the end of the
government’s questioning of Singh-Kaur:
Q: So, in other words, you were
helping the militants who were
involved in the terrorist activities.
Isn’t that true?
A: When we came from far away
to this (indiscernible) congregation,
then we may have some contact.
We never help in any other way
than giving them food.  Yes.
    21The BIA’s errors regarding the status
of the two entities are inextricably
interwoven with the ultimate conclusion
that the provision of food and tents to
members of these organizations was
“material support.”  This basis alone
warrants granting of the petition.
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The BIA and majority rely on this passage
to conclude that Singh-Kaur admitted to
having offered support to “militants who
were involved in terrorist activities.”
Therefore, the majority upholds the BIA’s
finding that Singh-Kaur offered “material
support . . . to any individual who the actor
knows, or reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist
activity.”
The majority’s reliance on this
passage is questionable at best.  Although
admissions may certainly be based on
leading questions, it is difficult to know
whether or not Singh-Kaur was agreeing to
the words put into his mouth by the
government lawyer and transmitted
through the translator, or what he meant by
the response relayed back through the
translator.  Indeed, moments before,
Singh-Kaur had adamantly denied that the
persons he helped were “militants.”22
Further, in the context of this appeal, the
term “terrorist activity” has a specified
legal definition, whereas we have no idea
what Singh-Kaur understood the term to
mean.  At the very least the passage is
ambiguous, and at the worst, reliance on
the passage fails the substantial evidence
test because it requires us to speculate as
to what Singh-Kaur was saying “Yes” to.
Despite these concerns, the case
need not turn on this issue, because even if
we were to assume that Singh-Kaur
admitted that the unnamed “militants” had
engaged in unspecified “terrorist activity,”
the BIA still has not established that the
food or the tents were material in any way.
Nothing in the record shows the type of
terrorist activities committed or planned by
these unnamed individuals, and nothing
shows how the food and tents were
relevant and important to these unnamed
persons engaging in unknown terrorist
activities.  Under such circumstances,
finding mere support to be “material”
support reads “material” out of the statute.
Though the BIA might have looked to
other bases for its decision, it did not do
so, and we cannot raise new bases in the
context of a petition for review.23
    22The majority also cites to an affidavit
Singh-Kaur filed in 1996 in connection
with his adjustment of status application,
in which he states that “after [Sant
Jarnail’s] death his group became militant
because of the violence perpetrated upon
him and his and his [sic] followers by the
Indian Military.”  Maj. Op. at 10.  It is
unclear how this proves anything.  We do
not know whether the individuals to whom
Singh-Kaur provided food and tents were
involved in militant activity at all,
whatever that activity might be.  Indeed,
Singh-Kaur later testified before the IJ that
the group was not militant.  More
fundamentally, there is no indication how
or whether unspecified militant activity
was “terrorist activity” for purposes of
INA § 212.  Indeed, Sant Jarnail is not a
Foreign Terrorist Organization or a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
organization.  See note 3, supra.
    23Although the government argues that
Singh-Kaur had the burden of proving he
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Thus, it is apparent that even
though the majority concedes that it cannot
affirm the BIA on the basis of material
support to a terrorist organization, it
nevertheless uses the affiliation of the
unnamed individuals to Sant Jarnail to
bootstrap a finding that they engaged in
terrorist activities, however unknown those
activities may be.  But bootstrapping and
conjecture are not even close to substantial
evidence that the food and tents were
material, i.e., relevant and important to
terrorism.  Where the “conclusion is not
based on a specific, cogent reason, but,
instead, is based on speculation,
conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported
personal opinion, we will not uphold it
because it will not have been supported by
such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind would find adequate.”  Dia v.
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003)
(en banc); see also Gao v. Ashcroft, 299
F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (findings
based on “speculation or conjecture, rather
than on evidence in the record, are
reversible”).  “In other words, [the finding]
was not inadmissible, the case does not
turn on which party bore the burden of
proof.  Here, the facts regarding the food
and tents were undisputed and Singh-
Kaur’s testimony must be treated as
credible.  Under these circumstances,
Singh-Kaur’s actions do not constitute
“material support” regardless of who bears
the burden.  These circumstances evoke
United States v. McGuire, 178 F.3d 203
(3d Cir. 1999), a federal arson case where
before the district court, the government
rested Commerce Clause jurisdiction
solely on the presence of a bottle of
Florida orange juice in the trunk of a car
used solely for intrastate business.  We
held that “a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
844(i) must rest upon more than the
dubious interstate commerce nexus of our
hypothetical cup of sugar, or the
ephemeral nexus of the government’s
carton of orange juice.”  Id. at 211-12.  We
rejected the government’s argument on
appeal that “we should now look past the
orange juice and consider other items that
were in the trunk” that might support
federal jurisdiction.  Id. at 206.
Here, just as in McGuire, although
the BIA might have relied upon other
information of record to support its
conclusion that Singh-Kaur provided
“material support,” the agency relied
solely on the food and tents.  The BIA did
not rely on the 1991 asylum application,
and we may not go searching for bases not
relied upon by the agency.  Possibly, the
BIA could have seized upon the fact that
Singh-Kaur testified  to providing
“transportation” to the individuals at issue,
but the BIA did not rely on this basis.  See
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).  See Navas, 217
F.3d at 658 n.16 (Court may not affirm
BIA on grounds on which the agency did
not rely). 
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will not have been supported by substantial
evidence.”  Dia, 353 F.3d at 250.24
IV.
That the BIA’s finding cannot be
upheld is underscored through the
government’s suggestion at oral argument
that the provision of a cup of water to a
terrorist could constitute “material
support.”  I have no doubt that under the
right facts, the provision of a single glass
of water to a terrorist could be material
support.  If bin Laden were dying of thirst
and asked for a cup of water to permit him
to walk another half mile and detonate a
weapon of mass destruction, such support
would be “material” to terrorism.  But
those facts are not before us, and
permitting a mere cup of water, without
more, to be “material support” reads
“material” out of the statute.
In reaching this conclusion, I
remain cognizant of the fact that the
executive branch is best-equipped to
handle the fast-changing circumstances of
the war against terror.  But courts may not
rewrite clear statute s or decide
immigration petitions on speculation.
Because “material support” does not mean
immaterial support, I would grant the
petition for review, vacate the order of the
BIA, and remand for further proceedings.25
    24Along these lines, the majority
discusses at  length Singh-Kaur’s
membership in Babbar Khalsa, the
International Sikh Youth Federation, and
the Khalistan Commando Force.  See Maj.
Op. at 10-11.  However, the food and tents
were not provided to these organizations,
but to individuals belonging to a different
organization, Sant Jarnail.  The relevance
of these facts to the food and tents is
nowhere explained, nor could it be.  More
fundamentally, the majority cannot and
does not identify the terrorist acts that
Singh-Kaur provided “material support”
for, for any group.  Although facts about
other groups paint Singh-Kaur in an
unfavorable light, they do not suffice to
provide anything more than speculation as
to how his “support” was “material” to
anything.  Finally, the BIA did not cite to
or rely upon Singh-Kaur’s membership to
such other groups.
    25Because I conclude that the statute’s
plain meaning dictates the outcome, I need
not rely on the rule of lenity.  See St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 320 (“longstanding principle
of construing any lingering ambiguities in
deportation statutes in favor of the alien”);
Ki Se Lee, 369 F.3d at 225.  Because the
statute is unambiguous and plain, the rule
of lenity has no bearing here.  See Ki Se
Lee, 369 F.3d at 227-28 n.13 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The rule of lenity . . . is
reserved for situations in which the normal
rules of statutory interpretation are
unhelpful.”).  Nonetheless, our adherence
to the rule of lenity in the immigration
context provides additional support for the
conclusion here.
